Tag Archives: CAR 21.1

Colorado Supreme Court grants certified question of law

PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 21.1, the Court granted a certified question posed by the United States Bankruptcy Court, for the District of Colorado in No. 15SA68, In re Michael and Marlene Heimann.

This post will be updated when more information about the issue certified becomes available.

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Dean Craft v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co, 2015CO11 (Feb. 17, 2015)

“Know the Gaps” – Farmer’s Insurance ad. The Colorado Supreme Court granted review of, and answered in the negative the following certified question from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: “whether the notice-prejudice rule applies to the date-certain notice requirement of claims-made policies.” The notice-prejudice rule (set forth in Friedland v Travelers) allows insureds to avoid the consequence of late notice of a claim under a “prompt-notice” provision if the insurer is not prejudiced. A “claims-made” policy, different from an “occurrence” policy, typically requires that notice of an occurrence be given by a date-certain as a condition precedent to coverage. The date-certain provision is, therefore, a material condition of coverage. Applying the notice-prejudice rule would alter the parties’ agreed allocation of risk, something the Court declined to do.



To read the 10th Circuit’s order following this opinion, click HERE.

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Filed under Contracts, Insurance, Interlocutory Review

Gary Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 2013CO38 (June 24, 2013)

“Thousands of possibilities [to sue]. Get yours.” – Best Buy tagline. Plaintiff was on Best Buy’s property to purchase a refrigerator and was injured. Plaintiff sued under the Premises Liability Act (PLA) and ended up in federal court. The district court dismissed, finding the PLA only applies to activities “directly and inherently” related to the land. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit certified a question to the Court asking if that was correct. Answer: no. The PLA is more broad than “directly and inherently,” but not so broad that it applies to any tort on another’s property. Interpreting Pierson v. Black Canyon, the Court held that the PLA applies to “conditions, activities, and circumstances on the property” that the landowner is liable for as a landowner. Thus, the fact-specific inquiry must include whether the injury was caused by the landowner’s actions as the landowner.



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Filed under Personal Injury, Torts