Jeopardy – Answer: a “subpoena” is different from “discovery,” but an “administrative hearing or proceeding” is the same as a “civil suit.” Question – why does CRS 12-36.5-104, establishing the peer review privilege, extend to a subpoena issued in an administrative proceeding? Reviewing this question pursuant to CAR 21, the Court held that the privilege protects all the records of a professional review committee from all subpoenas and all discovery, and renders such records inadmissible in civil suits including administrative proceedings of an adjudicatory nature. In this case, a doctor was denied a Colorado medical license and appealed the denial. She sought certain Letters of Concern issued by the Medical Board. An ALJ issued a subpoena for the letters. The Board objected and then appealed via CRCP 106 and CRS 24-4-106. Because the records were protected, the Board won.
Tag Archives: CRCP 106
In Re: Colorado Medical Board v. Office of Administrative Courts; Matthew E. Norwood, ALJ, and Polly Train, MD, 2014CO51 (June 23, 2014)
Jason L. Rodgers and James R. Hazel v. Board of County Commissioners of Summit County, 2013COA61 (April 25, 2013)
“Plaintiffs … a same-sex couple, primarily contend the County treated them differently from heterosexual couples when interpreting and enforcing [septic] regulations.” (Opinion). Plaintiffs sued. The trial court dismissed some claims and granted a partial directed verdict by removing certain “actions” from a single claim under 42 USC 1983 (1983). The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that under CRCP 50, a trial court can’t parse evidence supporting a single claim against a single defendant. But it affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of 1) an inverse condemnation claim (taking property through regulation) because the regulations did not rise to the level of a taking, 2) a discrimination claim not brought to the Civil Rights Commission as required, and 3) a direct constitutional challenge because 1983, CRCP 106, and CRS 24-10-118 provide alternate remedies.
Nature causes disasters; humans just fail to prevent them. Case in point: Hurricane Katrina. So, when Ouray reviewed the plans of a Developer to build in an area prone to flooding from a diverted natural waterway, it found the risk to be a “geologic condition” or a “natural hazard.” They required Developer to take significant mitigation measures to which Developer objected and then challenged in court under CRCP 106. The court of appeals rejected Developer’s challenge because Ouray had the authority and discretion to enforce a code requiring flood mitigation to preserve the public’s health, safety and welfare, even though some risk came from a structure built by Ouray. As a matter of municipal litigation practice, the court also made a specific point about not taking judicial notice of ordinances not included in the record. Ouray’s denial of Developer’s application was upheld.
Marc Giuliani, Footprints Health and Wellness, Inc., et. al., v. Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners, 2012COA190 (November 1, 2012)
A medical marijuana dispensary/center is not a medical office or clinic, retail sales or services establishment, drug store, medical supply distributor or seller of medical equipment and services. Here, the court upheld a zoning violation notice to a dispensary located in a retail shopping center zoned for only the above purposes. Specifically, the court found that: 1) neither Amendment 20 nor the regulatory statutes barred the zoning restriction, 2) Jefferson County was immune to equitable estoppel claims, and 3) the record supported the zoning violation citation. It also found that a ban on all medical marijuana centers in unincorporated areas, issued after the center opened, mooted certain claims because zoning compliance would be impossible. The remaining constitutional challenges were not preserved for appeal and the dispensary’s challenge was dismissed in full.