After all these years, rear-end car accidents still produce new law. Here, the court of appeals held that evidence of Medicaid benefits were properly excluded by the collateral source rule. Under CRS 10-1-135, any collateral source payment is excluded from evidence. Medicaid payments are a collateral source, and the statute abrogated the common law “gratuitous government benefits exception.” Plaintiffs’ claims against ANS, the company insuring the car, were dismissed; thus, ANS as the prevailing party was entitled to costs but not fees because the claims were not frivolous. The remaining issues got short shrift: 1) the sudden emergency doctrine has been abolished; 2) a party who requests a hearing on costs is entitled to one; 3) Plaintiffs were awarded appellate fees because Defendants frivolously argued for a new trial under CRCP 59 based on a requirement that did not exist.
Tag Archives: CRCP 59
James C. Smith and Dona Laurita, v. Alan W. Kinningham and Accelerated Network Solutions, Inc., 2013COA,103 (July 3, 2013)
Wile E. Coyote never got the Road Runner to smack into his wall painted like a road. Here, City hired Vista to construct medians in the middle of a road. The medians were completed by Vista and accepted by the City. For a while, the double yellow stripes led straight into the median, where plaintiff crashed her car. She sued Vista under both the PLA and common law negligence. After rejecting the application of the PLA because Vista was not a “landowner,” the court of appeals adopted new construction liability standards. It rejected the “completed and accepted” doctrine under which construction companies owed no duties to third parties after completing work. The court adopted a “foreseeability rule” making companies potentially liable even after work is completed, if it would be unreasonable to expect another party to mitigate a danger. The case was remanded to apply the new standard.
Aaa, adverse possession: open, notorious, hostile, exclusive, and continuous. Almost describes politics. But in this case, a coal company sought access to its own land, blocked by land adversely possessed, and claimed an implied easement of necessity, or alternatively, access over a road that was once public. The court of appeals held that a parcel of land for which there was a claim of adverse possession could be bounded by a natural feature and not just a fence. And, because the company’s need for access was in the future, and it could just build itself a bridge, it did not have an easement. Also, the failure to join the county as an indispensable party to decide if the road was abandoned or public was fatal to that claim. Last, the court held that a post-trial amendment of the pleadings should have been allowed because an excluded claim was actually tried.