Tag Archives: Debt

Cynthia H. Coffman, as Attorney General, and Julie Ann Meade, as the Administrator of the Uniform Debt Management Services Act, v. Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr., Esq.; Donald Drew Moore, Esq.; and Morgan Drexen, Inc., a California corporation, and Walter Joseph Ledda, 2015CO35 (May 26, 2015).

“It isn’t what we say or think that defines us, but what we do.” – Jane Austen. Some companies offer debt-management services to debtors. Plaintiff is one of them. They are regulated by CRS 12-14.5-202. (the DMSA). Attorneys providing such services are exempt from regulation. Plaintiff (consisting entirely of nonlawyers) hired “local counsel” and sought “legal services exemption.” The Court, interpreting the DMSA with Colo.RPC 5.3, held that nonlawyer assistants may be exempt if they work for an attorney in substance, not just in name, and under the attorney’s supervision. Here, Plaintiff’s attorneys, some out-of-state , did not actually provide meaningful instruction or supervision. Although the Court, through CRCP 205.1, not the Legislature, regulates attorneys, the DMSA did violate the Separation of Powers doctrine. Thus, Plaintiff was subject to regulation.

https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/Opinions/2014/14SA249.pdf

http://www.cobar.org/opinions/opinion.cfm?opinionid=9789&courtid=2

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Filed under Attorney Regulation, Constitutional

Colorado Supreme Court grants certified question of law

PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 21.1, the Court granted a certified question posed by the United States Bankruptcy Court, for the District of Colorado in No. 15SA68, In re Michael and Marlene Heimann.

This post will be updated when more information about the issue certified becomes available.

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Alva Hickerson v. Thomas Vessels, 2014CO2 (January 13, 2014)

“Don’t wait for the last judgment – it takes place every day.” Albert Camus. In this case, four issues are at play: 1) the equitable doctrine of laches (prevents a party from waiting too long to bring a claim); 2) the statute of limitations for collecting a debt (six years); 3) the doctrine of partial payment (restarts the six years after a partial payment); and 4) the separation of powers doctrine (prevents application of equitable doctrines to expressly conflicting statutes). The court of appeals held that laches cannot shorten a limitations period because the separation of powers doctrine prevented it. The Court reversed because laches does not conflict with the statute of limitations, and the partial payment doctrine does not preclude laches, even though it effectively lengthens the time within which a claim can be brought. The Court remanded for review of the laches claim.

http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/Opinions/2012/12SC198.pdf

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Filed under Constitutional, Contracts

Jerry Mullins v. Medical Lien Management, Inc., 2013COA134 (Sept. 26, 2013)

This case is a fight over $17,000.00. This appeal is about civil procedure. Plaintiff filed an interpleader action to determine who was entitled to funds recovered from a tortfeasor in a personal injury case. Medical Lien Management (MLM) filed an Answer and Counterclaims. Plaintiff then amended the Complaint, which MLM Answered without reasserting its counterclaims. 1 1/2 years later, Plaintiff claimed MLM had waived or abandoned its right to assert the Counterclaims. The trial court disagreed. The court of appeals did too because: 1) there is no requirement that counterclaims be repleaded in response to an amended complaint; 2) MLM prosecuted its claims, which did not prejudice Plaintiff; 3) technical defects must be disregarded if they do not affect the rights of the parties; and 4) a claim not pleaded but still tried can be decided. Evidentiary rulings were also upheld.

http://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Court_of_Appeals/Opinion/2013/11CA0699-PD.pdf

http://www.cobar.org/opinions/opinion.cfm?opinionid=9094&courtid=1

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Filed under Contracts, Proceedure

Oasis Legal Finance, LLC, et. al., and Funding Holding, Inc., d/b/a LawCash v. John W. Suthers, as Attorney General; and Laura E. Udis, as the Administrator, Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 2013COA82 (May 23, 2013)

“You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.” – Inigo Montoya, Princess Bride. Here, Plaintiffs pay tort plaintiffs while their cases are pending. Repayment depends on the net amount recovered (if any); and if recovery exceeds net proceeds, the debt is increased based on time. The Administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code, CRS 5-1-101 to 13-103 (UCCC), found the agreements were unlawful “loans.” Plaintiffs disagreed and sued. The court of appeals, like the trial court, found for Administrator. Under the UCCC, a “loan” is a debt created by the lender’s payment, or agreement to pay, money to a consumer. A “debt” is either fixed (a specific sum due) or contingent (not presently fixed but may become fixed in the future). A debt is not, however, an unconditional promise to pay. Here, Plaintiffs’ payments were contingent debts and thus loans.

http://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Court_Of_Appeals/Opinion/2013/12CA1130-PD.pdf

http://www.cobar.org/opinions/opinion.cfm?opinionid=8958&courtid=1

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Filed under Administrative, Contracts, Government

Portercare Adventist Health System v. Robert Lego, 2012CO58 (September 24, 2012)

Two months into a three-month hospital stay, a health insurance company stopped paying the bills of the wife of the Respondent. Four years later the hospital sought to collect the amount owed. The Defendant/Respondent claimed that the 3 year statute of limitations should apply and bar the claim. The hospital argued the bill was a “liquidated debt” and therefore subject to the 6 year statute of limitations. The Court reversed the court of appeals citing Rotenberg v. Richards, 899 P.2d 365 (Colo. App. 1995) nine times in a 23 paragraph opinion. It held that in the context of hospital bills, a “liquidated debt” is one ascertainable from the contract itself, or by simple calculation using extrinsic evidence if necessary. Here, because the hospital used a pre-determined market standard and uniform rate subject to disclosure to all patients, the debt was ascertainable using simple math.

http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/Opinions/2010/10SC765.pdf

http://www.cobar.org/opinions/opinion.cfm?opinionid=8671&courtid=2

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Filed under Contracts