“Millennial Moms Focused on ‘Me’ Time, Study Says.” Time has value in a marriage; so it has value in a divorce. As a matter of first impression, the Court considered whether accrued time off earned during a marriage is marital “property” subject to equitable distribution. The trial court divided husband’s accrued time; the court of appeals reversed finding the value too uncertain to be deemed property and remanded. The Court affirmed on different grounds, examining two strains of thought: 1) leave as an alternative form of wages is not property; or 2) leave as deferred compensation and is property. The Court held that leave has value as time off or as cash, so if an enforceable right to be paid for leave exists, it is property. If its value can be reasonably ascertained it is divisible; if not, the time should be treated as an economic circumstance when equitably dividing property.
Tag Archives: Divorce
In Re: Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.D.E., and Concerning Bernice M. Spencer, Intervenor, and Scott Rottler, Petitioner, 2013COA13 (January 31, 2013)
Grandparents are great; but great-grandparents are not “grandparents.” Following the dissolution of a marriage, the grandmother of a child’s mother (Great-grandmother), sought visitation rights. Father objected. The trial court allowed Great-grandmother to intervene to seek visitation. Father obtained interlocutory review pursuant to CRS 13-4-102 and CAR 4.2. The court of appeals reversed. Under CRS 19-1-117 and CRS 19-1-103(56) a “grandparent” is “a person who is the parent of child’s father or mother.” Great-grandparents are not such a person. Although the Children’s Code is liberally construed in favor of the best interests of the child, unambiguous language, combined with the protection of parents’ rights under Troxel v. Granville, do not permit an expansion of the definition of grandparent. Thus, Great-grandmother lacked standing to seek visitation.
In Re Estate of Jeffrey Johnson, deceased, Laurel Christensen v. Dawn Wilson, Personal Representative, 2012COA209 (November 21, 2012)
As your life changes, so should your insurance. This case involves a marriage, life insurance, divorce, and death – in that order. Ex-wife sought life insurance proceeds on a policy to which she was named a beneficiary while married. The trial court dismissed her claims and the court of appeals affirmed. CRS 15-11-804 revokes any revocable disposition of property made to a former spouse, including designations in insurance policies. The divorce removed ex-wife as a beneficiary under the policy. Policy language that requires written notice to change beneficiaries did not abrogate the statute because: 1) regulations created an expectation the law would apply, 2) the parties’ rights are not impaired by the law, and 3) the policy does not expressly exempt automatic revocation. Similarly, the policy could not be reformed because ex-wife lacked standing upon revocation.