Tag Archives: Interpretation

Stanislaw Krol v. CF&I Steel, LP, 2013COA32 (March 14, 2013)

You are either in or out. ‘Cause if you are in, you are immune – workers’ compensation 101. “Statutory employers” (SEs) have immunity from suit for injuries to employees of a contractor (workers). Under CRS-8-41-402, a property owner is an SE if “any work [is] done on and to said property [by a worker].” Here, plaintiff was a worker on defendant CF&I’s property, was injured and sued CF&I. CF&I claimed it was an SE and thus immune. The trial court agreed with CF&I because plaintiff was working “on” CF&I’s property. It also relied on an argument not raised by CF&I, and without giving plaintiff notice. The court of appeals reversed. The plain statutory language uses “and” conjunctively; thus, work must be done both “on” and “to” the property to be an SE. Further, though a trial court may grant judgment for reasons not raised by the movant, it should give notice to the nonmoving party first.

http://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Court_Of_Appeals/Opinion/2012/12CA0226-PD.pdf

http://www.cobar.org/opinions/opinion.cfm?opinionid=8863&courtid=1

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Filed under Personal Injury, Proceedure, Torts

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [as Receiver for Community Banks] v. Yale Fisher, 2013CO5 (January 22, 2013)

There is an old saying, “Banks will only lend money to people who don’t need a loan.” Actually, banks normally off-set the risk of non-payment by adding a 36% default interest rate. But in this case, the original agreement did not include 36% default interest. A series of later modifications added a 36% default rate, but without noting it as a changed term. That seemed to make the rate ambiguous. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the later modifications unambiguously included the 36% rate. The Credit Agreement Statute of Frauds, CRS 38-10-124, allows for extrinsic evidence to be considered to resolve ambiguous credit agreements. Here, extrinsic evidence suggested that the 36% rate was only added later as a computer error. However, as the contract was unambiguous, the statute didn’t apply and the evidence could not be considered. The borrower owed 36% on the defaulted amount.

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Filed under Contracts, Evidence