“The [Medical Marijuana] Amendment does not require patients to do anything.” – Opinion. This is a forfeiture case arising from a criminal prosecution. Defendant was arrested for possessing marijuana; the police seized his pot and plants. Defendant was acquitted and requested the return of his pot. The trial court ordered the police to return the pot, which they did, over the objection of the prosecution. The DA appealed. Colorado’s Constitution Art. XVIII sec 14(2)(e) requires the return of pot seized from a patient if a jury acquits the patient of charges arising from the seized marijuana. The DA argued that returning pot under CO law was preempted as an obstacle to the federal Controlled Substances Act. The court of appeals affirmed the to order to return the pot. Federalism does not allow the federal government to require states to seize and hold marijuana, thus, no preemption.
Tag Archives: Moot
Marc Giuliani, Footprints Health and Wellness, Inc., et. al., v. Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners, 2012COA190 (November 1, 2012)
A medical marijuana dispensary/center is not a medical office or clinic, retail sales or services establishment, drug store, medical supply distributor or seller of medical equipment and services. Here, the court upheld a zoning violation notice to a dispensary located in a retail shopping center zoned for only the above purposes. Specifically, the court found that: 1) neither Amendment 20 nor the regulatory statutes barred the zoning restriction, 2) Jefferson County was immune to equitable estoppel claims, and 3) the record supported the zoning violation citation. It also found that a ban on all medical marijuana centers in unincorporated areas, issued after the center opened, mooted certain claims because zoning compliance would be impossible. The remaining constitutional challenges were not preserved for appeal and the dispensary’s challenge was dismissed in full.
A public hospital can wantonly kill but can’t be sued. In this case, a patient goes to CU’s hospital for monitoring of his epileptic seizures. Concerned, his family asks if they should stay with him. A staff member told them the patient would be monitored full time. He wasn’t, suffered a seizure, and died. The family sued and claimed the hospital and its employees consciously disregarded the danger. The court of appeals held that the hospital itself was immune from suit under the CGIA, even if it acted in a willful and wanton manner; its employees, though, were not immune. But wanton conduct must be alleged with specific facts (“upon information and belief” is fine) showing the defendant was consciously aware of a danger and acted or failed to act without regard for that danger. Here, only allegations against a doctor were sufficient and could go forward. All other claims were dismissed.
Divorces can get pretty contentious, with everyone looking for an advantage. In this case, Father gets Mother’s employment file from an old employer by issuing a subpoena duces tecum under CRCP 45. It takes one hour to get the file, but three days to give Mother notice of the subpoena. Subpoenaed documents are often produced in advance, and the appearance of the person subpoenaed is then waived. The Court did not rebuke that practice so long as all the parties and the subpoenaed witness consents. Otherwise, the Court held, documents may only be produced at the designated deposition, hearing, or trial. This requirement is not dependant upon the documents being confidential or privileged because the interest being protected is the right to notice and an opportunity to object prior to production. Here, Father’s attorney faces potential sanctions for her violation of CRCP 45.