Opinion in pro se Plaintiff’s appeal published; parent was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The Colorado High School Activities Association’s bylaws allows athletes to compete on “any other team, in any non-school activity or event in that sport during that sports season with the express written permission of the principal.” Plaintiff’s son, a Durango HS athlete won a 10k cross country race in Ohio but did not get permission to compete and was suspended from one meet. Plaintiff, apparently an Ohio lawyer, sued on behalf of his son. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. It noted many failures to comply with the CAR. And, Plaintiff engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by bringing claims on behalf of his son. Plaintiff’s case was dismissed because he failed to comply with CGIA notice requirements, depriving the court of jurisdiction.
Tag Archives: Notice
M.S. and S.S. v. The People In the Interest of A.C., and A.C., by and through his Guardian ad Litem.
“AC was born with cocaine in his system.” (Opinion). So begins a series of unfortunate events. AC’s third foster home parents are the petitioners (MS). They wanted to adopt AC. Initially the Denver DHS (DHS) called them “prospective adoptive parents,” until a report raised concerns about the mother. DHS removed AC without notice to anyone; a hearing was eventually held and the removal affirmed. MS appealed, arguing they had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in their relationship with AC based on their reasonable expectation that their relationship with A.C. would continue. The Court held they did not because neither CRS 19-3-507 (foster parents have a right to notice and participation), nor the 14th Amendment creates such an interest absent significant progress towards actual adoption. MS never started the adoption process and only had a foster parent’s rights.
“The other car collided with mine without giving warning of its intention.” (Anonymous). Here, MLM paid an accident victim’s medical bills in exchange for an assignment of settlement funds, if any. MLM gave notice of the assignment to the tortfeasor’s insurer Allstate, who then settled. Allstate paid the victim instead of MLM. MLM sued Allstate for breach of both the settlement contract and the assignment. The trial court dismissed MLM’s claims. The court of appeals reversed, holding: 1) personal injury claims may be validly assigned prior to settlement, as they were here; 2) the notice of assignment was sufficient and triggered Allstate’s duty to pay MLM, despite its lack of consent; and 3) because the victim had a claim against Allstate, MLM had a claim. Finally, the court rejected a request to apply the Federal pleading standards in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly. Dismissal reversed.
“Ooops, I sued the wrong person. My bad.” In this Rule 21 original proceeding, plaintiff, the estate of a worker killed on defendant’s property, sued defendant just within the 2 year statute of limitations period. After it passed, it turned out that another party was the proper defendant. Plaintiff moved to amend to include the correct defendant under CRCP 15(c), claiming the amended complaint related back to the timely-filed original complaint. The trial court dismissed because the new defendant was added 116 days after the filing of the original complaint and after the statute of limitations period had run. The Court reversed and held that amending a complaint and serving a new defendant within the time for regular service under CRCP 4(m), 120 days, was a reasonable amount of time. On remand, the trial court must determine if the delay in notice was otherwise unreasonable.
The competition for Aspen property can be fierce – or is it? An estate owns an Aspen condo. It gets foreclosed. The only 3 bidders at the sale bid up the price and then decide to form a joint venture to purchase the property and stop the bidding. They buy the condo. The Court finds they did not engage in unlawful bid-rigging because they did not interfere with competition, or agree to the venture ahead of time, and paid well above the starting price. A co-representative of the estate sought to set aside the sale. She received actual notice of the foreclosure sale but the estate did not. CRCP 120 strictly requires actual notice. Because wife received actual notice of the sale, the estate had constructive notice and chose not to object. So the lack of actual notice did not harm the estate. The sale is not set aside, notwithstanding the failure to comply strictly with CRCP 120.