The technical task of taxing property under tax increment financing (TIF) plans is, well, technical. A TIF is used to fund the sale of municipal bonds for urban renewal. Under CRS 31-25-101 to 115, a TIF property is valued before it is included in the urban renewal plan (base value); subsequent increases in value, and the increased taxes therefrom, then finance the urban renewal authority (URA). Here, property was included in a TIF but later removed. The statute does not address how to calculate a TIF in this situation. The Assessor included the property in the base value, but not in the newly assessed value. This method, the court of appeals held, was erroneous because it created an imbalance in the URA’s TIF funding. But, the Assessor correctly measured the TIF’s 25-year termination date from the date the TIF was adopted, not after property was added. A new TIF calculation was ordered.
Tag Archives: Statutory
Northglenn Urban Renewal Authority v. Gil Reyes as Adams County Assessor and Board of County Commissioners of Adams County, 2013COA24 (February 28, 2013).
You are either in or out. ‘Cause if you are in, you are immune – workers’ compensation 101. “Statutory employers” (SEs) have immunity from suit for injuries to employees of a contractor (workers). Under CRS-8-41-402, a property owner is an SE if “any work [is] done on and to said property [by a worker].” Here, plaintiff was a worker on defendant CF&I’s property, was injured and sued CF&I. CF&I claimed it was an SE and thus immune. The trial court agreed with CF&I because plaintiff was working “on” CF&I’s property. It also relied on an argument not raised by CF&I, and without giving plaintiff notice. The court of appeals reversed. The plain statutory language uses “and” conjunctively; thus, work must be done both “on” and “to” the property to be an SE. Further, though a trial court may grant judgment for reasons not raised by the movant, it should give notice to the nonmoving party first.
Jamie Webb, Jeffrey Hermanson, and Michaleen Jeronimus v. City of Black Hawk, 2013CO9 (February 4, 2013)
The history of gold, bicycles and casinos meet at the confluence of Gregory Gulch and the North Fork of Clear Creek. Black Hawk banned bicycles blocking riders from passing through. If a Home Rule ordinance is not strictly a matter of local concern, and conflicts with state law, it is unconstitutional. Here, the Court held the matter was a mix of state and local concern because the ban had an extraterritorial “ripple effect” on non-residents, such as blocking access to Central City. The ban failed the conflict test because bicycling is a protected mode of transportation within Colorado, and state law limits bans unless an alternative route within 450 feet of the banned route is provided for bicyclists. There was no alternative route as required by CRS 42-4-109. Although CRS 42-4-111 permits local regulation of bicycles, Black Hawk’s ban was struck down for conflicting with state law.
In Re: Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.D.E., and Concerning Bernice M. Spencer, Intervenor, and Scott Rottler, Petitioner, 2013COA13 (January 31, 2013)
Grandparents are great; but great-grandparents are not “grandparents.” Following the dissolution of a marriage, the grandmother of a child’s mother (Great-grandmother), sought visitation rights. Father objected. The trial court allowed Great-grandmother to intervene to seek visitation. Father obtained interlocutory review pursuant to CRS 13-4-102 and CAR 4.2. The court of appeals reversed. Under CRS 19-1-117 and CRS 19-1-103(56) a “grandparent” is “a person who is the parent of child’s father or mother.” Great-grandparents are not such a person. Although the Children’s Code is liberally construed in favor of the best interests of the child, unambiguous language, combined with the protection of parents’ rights under Troxel v. Granville, do not permit an expansion of the definition of grandparent. Thus, Great-grandmother lacked standing to seek visitation.
In the Matter of Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for Proposed Initiatives 2011-2012 Nos. 67, 68, 69, and 94, 95, Philip Hayes v. David Ottke and John Slota and Barbara Walker and Don Childears v. Earl Staelin and Robert Bows, 2012CO1 (January 7, 2013)
Direct democracy takes citizen initiatives directly to the voters. Colorado’s Constitution, article V section 1, provides for such initiatives. But, they must meet various standards before they are placed on the ballot, and the Title Board is authorized to decide if initiatives meet those standards. CRS 1-40-106 requires “each designated representative” (proponent) to appear at Board meetings at which the ballot issue is considered. If a proponent fails to appear, the Board lacks authority to take any action. Here, two different initiatives were brought. In each case, however, only 1 of the 2 proponents appeared at a rehearing. In this original proceeding, the Court held that both proponents must appear at each hearing. If they do not, the Board lacks authority to set titles and put matters on the ballot. Because only 1 of 2 proponents appeared, the Board lacked authority to act.